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Reflections of an Affirmative Action Baby, by
Stephen L. Carter (New York: Basic Books, 1991),
286 pp.
In Reflections of an Affirmative Action Baby,
Stephen L. Carter, an Afro-American law professor
at Yale University, has written a wide-ranging book
on affirmative action policy. Like numerous other
books on the subject, Carter covers the issues of its
legitimacy as policy, white opposition, impact on
black mobility, and contradictions faced by univer-
sities in administering affirmative action. Carter
also offers a new area of discussion — namely, the
evolving division among Afro-Americans regarding
affirmative action, allocating six of eleven chapters
to facets of this issue. Carter uses his own experi-
ences to frame these discussions — a mode of dis-
course that offers considerable rhetorical facility.
This outcome suits his essential purpose, to high-
light the downside rather than the upside of affirma-
tive action policy. But unlike such openly conserva-
tive critics of affirmative action as Nathan Glazer
and Thomas Sowell, Carter arrives at a negative
position after having first embraced affirmative
action. Hence, his characterization of himself as "an
affirmative action baby."
Carter's Political Demeanor
The first thing that stands out about Carter's
book is the author's political and ideological pos-
ture toward affirmative action. On the one hand,
Carter's purpose is clearly antithetical to affirmative
action policy. He wants to demonstrate, for instance,
that affirmative action has run its course as accept-
able public policy, to critique illegitimate extensions
of affirmative action disguised as diversity policy,
and above all, to warn Afro-Americans to prepare
for the demise of affirmative action, a preparation
he thinks requires greater civility of debate among
Afro-American intellectuals and leaders — a comity
of discourse rather akin to Mrs. Finch's sewing club.
As Carter says, "Sometimes I . . . have childish day-
dreams: Thomas Sowell and Derrick Bell shaking
hands across the conference table. . . ." (p. 142)
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Yet, on the other hand, Carter is insistent that his
opposition to affirmative action is not tantamount
to a conservative demeanor. Instead, Carter craves
to be seen and understood as a friend of Afro-
America's civil rights agenda— and a rather special
friend at that, one who happens to have the jump on
other black intellectuals in spotting the conditions
bringing about the collapse of affirmative action
policy. As Carter puts it:
Mine is not, I hope, a position that will be
thought inauthentically black. It is not, I
think, evidence of that most fatal of diseases
(for a black intellectual), neoconservatism; my
views on many other matters are sufficiently to
the left that I do not imagine the conservative
movement would want me. (Neither, I think,
would the left— but that is fine with me, for it is
best for intellectuals to be politically unpre-
dictable.) The argument I present in this book
is generated by reason but fired by love [for
blacks], (p. 7)
Thus, Carter wants his readers — especially Afro-
American readers — to see him as ideologically
neuter— without a political gender, so to speak—
neither fish nor foul, just a kind of ideologically
sterile dispenser of public policy and moral insights
regarding the dismantling of affirmative action
practices. Carter also wants us to believe that his in-
sights are not weighted in favor of the conservative
white power structures or white working-class con-
servatism. He wants his insights viewed as politically
neutral guidelines to a postracial America in which,
Carter hopes, Americans will surrender race-linked
discourse (along with gender-linked discourse) re-
garding individual experiences and American insti-
tutional dynamics.
This argument, presented in humanistic terms
and breezy verbiage, has a curious quality: consider-
ing his background as a law and policy analyst, his
discussion is strangely lacking in what might be
called policy specificity. In other words, once Afro-
Americans have followed Carter's advice and wil-
lingly surrendered affirmative action policy without
a fuss — a policy very much the operational center-
piece of the civil rights agenda — Carter offers not
one clue as to how blacks and their allies should pro-
ceed to engage both the public and private sectors to
facilitate closure of the black-white mobility gap
rooted in America's racist patterns.
Moreover, Carter's claim that his discussion of af-
firmative action is free of any ideological tilt is
politically naive and even intellectually disingenu-
ous. Carter must surely be aware that such conserva-
tive organs as the Wall Street Journal and the
National Review are intrinsically more attracted to
his perspective than, say, the New York Amsterdam
News, published by civil rights activist Wilbert
Tatum. Nor would such mainstream organs of the
new black bourgeoisie as Black Enterprise display an
intrinsic openness to Carter's presumptively apoliti-
cal, anti-affirmative action perspective. Why? Be-
cause the owner and editor of Black Enterprise, Earl
Graves, knows the impact that current efforts to dis-
mantle affirmative action policies have had on black
businesses — efforts like the 1989 Supreme Court
decision in Richmond v. Croson, a decision clearly
responsible for the sharp decline of Atlanta's con-
tracts to minority firms from 43 percent in 1988 to
14.5 percent in 1990.
*
The Affirmative Action Issue
Basic to Carter's claim that affirmative action has
run its course as acceptable public policy are three
interrelated arguments: first, affirmative action is
now opposed by most whites, especially when
preferential treatment is the mechanism of affirma-
tive action; second, affirmative action is flawed be-
cause it disproportionately benefits middle- and
upper-class blacks (what I call the coping strata),
not the poor, one-third of Afro-Americans; third,
Carter believes that American upward mobility pat-
terns are mediated by paradigms of pure achieve-
ment or pure merit, creating moral confusion re-
garding the mobility status of Afro-American bene-
ficiaries of affirmative action— did they make it on
their own or by racial preferences?
Carter attaches much significance to white atti-
tudes for a very good reason— because the conserva-
tive Republican leadership under Bush manipulates
the race-linked anxiety of white voters by emphasiz-
ing the preferential aspect of affirmative action.
Carter says he wants to take this issue away from the
conservative Republicans, a seemingly liberal thrust
on his part. From another vantage point, however,
Carter's wish to appease the anxiety of whites re-
garding affirmative action represents a rather con-
servative posture, for the appeasing mechanism
involves the surrender by blacks of a twenty-five-
year policy. Carter suggests that this is the only road
to liberalizing white voters on the overall policy
needs of blacks — a suggestion put forth by other
neoliberal critics of affirmative action including
Thomas Edsall in Chain Reaction: The Impact of
Race, Rights, And Taxes On American Politics (1991)
and Jim Sleeper in The Closest of Strangers (1990).
Carter wants his readers— especially Afro-American
readers— to see him as ideobgically neuter— without
a political gender, so to speak . . .
Carter's discussion of the need for blacks to ap-
pease white voters' anxiety toward affirmative
action never mentions a reciprocal obligation on the
part of whites, nor does he probe the possible politi-
cal methodologies that might ensure this. Pre-
sumably, the injury done by affirmative action
policy to whites' mobility interests and normative
sensibilities— relating to presumptively pristine
values of achievement and merit — negates the right
of blacks to expect a reciprocal obligation. I suggest,
in short, that something fundamentally conserva-
tive—and neoconservative, at that — informs Car-
ter's critique of affirmative action, his protestations
to the contrary notwithstanding.
In regard to the class bias of affirmative action
toward the coping strata rather than poor Afro-
Americans, Carter commences his discussion with
the following observation:
What has happened in black America in the era
of affirmative action is this: middle-class black
people are better off and lower-class black peo-
ple are worse off. Income stratification ... in
the black community has increased sharply
. . . the number of black people in the higher-
paying professional positions is growing faster
than the number of white people. And at the
elite educational institutions . . . affirmative
action . . . programs are increasingly domi-
nated by the children of the middle class. One
need not argue that affirmative action is the
cause of increasing income inequality in black
America to understand that it is not a solution.
(PP. 71-72)
Thus, Carter argues that a basic contradiction — a
hypocritical dynamic— exists in the civil rights intel-
ligentsia's support of affirmative action. In Carter's
words, "The degree of one's support for affirmative
action in the professions bears no relation to the de-
gree of one's concern about the situation of the
black people who are worst off, for the programs do
them little good." Because of this contradiction,
Carter is willing to dismiss affirmative action as
merely a sham — an ostensibly progressive policy
which has been co-opted by well-to-do blacks. As
Carter puts it, "All the efforts at seeking to justify
racial preferences as justice or compensation mask
the simple truth that among those training for busi-
ness and professional careers, the benefits of af-
firmative action fall to those least in need of them."
(p. 72)
Carter is willing to dismiss affirmative action as
merely a sham— an ostensibly progressive policy
which has been co-opted by well-to-do blacks.
I agree with Carter's characterization of the bour-
geois tilt of affirmative action policy and I would
like to see this tilt balanced toward the poor. How-
ever, I disagree with Carter's implication— namely,
that the bourgeois tilt is intrinsically illegitimate, an
argument common among neoconservative op-
ponents of affirmative action. Princeton University
political scientist Russell Nieli wrote in a letter to the
New York Times (24 July 1991), "Affirmative action
programs . . . often benefit those who do not de-
serve benefits." Such criticism lacks historical and
comparative perspective. Affirmative action policy
is a governmental response to the longstanding, un-
democratic, racial-caste marginalization of Afro-
Americans. Since middle-class blacks as well as
poor blacks suffered, both sectors of Afro-Ameri-
cans are legitimate potential beneficiaries of this
policy. Furthermore, the bourgeois tilt of affirma-
tive action policy is hardly unique. Other federal as-
sistance policies for farmers, small businesses, veter-
ans, and banks, for instance, have involved cases of
those who are better off benefiting disproportion-
ately. The bourgeois sector of white ethnic groups of
Irish, Italians, and Jews also gained special benefits
through what might be called defacto affirmative
action— the awarding of city and state contracts,
loans, and jobs through patronage since the late
19th century. 2
What is the function of this argument for oppo-
nents of affirmative action like Carter? I suggest it is
not to create an argument in favor of affirmative
action policy to benefit poor blacks, but to create
arguments detrimental to the existence of affirma-
tive assistance programs at all. This is clearly a con-
servative function that flows from a seemingly
liberal argument, that is, a pro-poor argument. In
this connection, it is interesting that professed ad-
vocates of the poor among the critics of affirmative
action— like Carter— do not propose extending the
definition of the poor constituency they suggest
would be better served by affirmative action. In
other words, why not include the over 15 million
poor, white Americans as potential beneficiaries of
affirmative action? I suggest that the bourgeois-tilt
critics of affirmative action are not in fact intrinsi-
cally interested in the plight of the poor, but rather
invoke this plight as a foil for attacking affirmative
action as such.
The Pure-Merit Fetish
Overall, Carter's antipathy to affirmative action is
closely tied to his belief that black mobility under
affirmative action lacks moral quality. Throughout
his book, Carter displays a fervent emotional need
to have what he considers his own superior intellec-
tual and professional achievement in law measured
at par with comparable achievement by white pro-
fessionals. In this, Carter joins the former Harvard
University economist Glenn Loury (now at Boston
University) and the Stanford University economist
Thomas Sowell in blaming affirmative action poli-
cies for introducing a structure for the evaluation of
black professionals that, to their minds, emphasizes
the helping-hand role of public policy to the detri-
ment of the black individual's intrinsic capability.
Carter formulates this dilemma under the heading
of "best black syndrome"— a valuative mode in
which whites measure high achieving blacks against
each other, not against comparable high achieving
whites, labelling the highest achieving black "best
black." Conservative black intellectuals, in general
(including Sowell, Loury, and Shelby Steele, among
others), and Carter, in particular, have shown exas-
peration and even bitterness toward this best black
syndrome. Carter formulates his position as follows:
The best black syndrome creates in those of us
who have benefitted from racial preferences a
peculiar contradiction. We are told over and
over that we are among the best black people in
our professions. And in part we are flattered
. . . [for] those who call us the best black law-
yers or doctors or investment bankers consider
it a compliment. But to professionals who have
worked hard to succeed, flattery of this kind
carries an unsubtle insult, for we yearn to be
called what our achievements often deserve:
simply the best— no qualifiers needed! In this
[race conscious] society, however, we sooner or
later must accept that being viewed as the best
blacks ispart ofwhat has led us to where we are.
... (p. 52) (Italics added)
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At another point in his account of the best black
syndrome, Carter relates the thinking of economist
Glenn Loury on this issue:
A few years ago, in a panel discussion on racial
preferences, the economist Glenn Loury noted
that the Harvard Law School had on its faculty
two black professors who are also former law
clerks for Justices of the Supreme Court of the
United States. ... It isn't fair, he argued, that
they should be dismissed as affirmative action
appointments when they are obviously
strongly qualified for the positions they hold.
... It is no diminution of the achievements of
the professors Loury had in mind to point out
that there is no real way to tell whether they
would have risen to the top if not for the fact
that faculties are on the lookout [owing to af-
firmative action] for highly qualified people of
color. The same is surely true for many black
people rising to the top of political, economic,
and educational institutions, (p. 59)
It is interesting that black conservatives should
think that the question of demonstrating pure-merit
mobility is a special issue confronting blacks, His-
panics, and women under affirmative action policy.
Loury, Steele, Carter, and other conservatives make
a fetish of it. Why do black conservatives articulate
this position? They do so, I think, because Amer-
ica's job recruitment culture is defined at the ideal
level as & pure-meritparadigm, and opponents of af-
firmative action have skillfully kept this paradigm at
the forefront of popular thinking about affirmative
action. But this has been unfair for affirmative
action, for in reality America's job recruitment cul-
ture has been a pragmatic admixture of the pure-
merit paradigm and what might be called a modi-
fied-meritparadigm. The term modified-merit para-
digm refers to a dynamic in industry, government,
education, and banking wherein job entry is sur-
rounded by extra pure-merit processes — buddy net-
works of lawyers, doctors, managers, academics,
and others, as well as other forms of assistance
based on ethnicity, veterans status, or other condi-
tions. Contrary to conservative criticisms of af-
firmative action, the modified-merit paradigm
under affirmative action is not anti-pure merit. The
two function together enabling newcomers to job
markets from which they had previously been ex-
cluded to mount the conveyor belt of experience that
will prepare them for pure-merit capability. As such,
this functional interface of pure- and modified-
merit paradigms under affirmative action consti-
tutes a classic expression of American pragmatism
at its best. The admixture of pure- and modified-
merit paradigms in job recruitment has charac-
terized the social mobility experience of all Ameri-
can ethnic groups in many job markets, and efforts
by conservatives to suggest that only affirmative
action policy has used this methodology are dis-
ingenuous. 3
Of course, there is no denying that affirmative
action policy has depended on this methodology
more explicitly and formally and for good reason.
Due to the institutionally tenacious racist marginali-
zation of Afro-Americans from the 1880s to the
1960s 4 (or the equally tenacious gender marginaliza-
tion of women during the same era), federal public
policy intervention was required to provide a frame-
work for what I call modified-merit job recruitment
(or contracts allocation) for blacks, Hispanics, and
women. The experience of this methodology— that
is, admixture of modified- and pure-merit para-
digms—in the United States armed forces has been
Carter's antipathy to affirmative action is closely
tied to his belief that black mobility under
affirmative action lacks moral quality.
an enormous success, as demonstrated in the studies
by Northwestern University sociologist Charles
Moskos. Although conservative opponents of af-
firmative action conveniently ignore the experience
of the armed forces, the data show barely 2 percent
of blacks in officer ranks during the 1970s, but by
the end of the 1980s some 12 percent of officers
(7,000) were black, including 7 percent of generals
and 11 percent of colonels. Barely 5 percent of non-
commissioned officers were black during the 1970s,
but by the end of the 1980s, 24 percent of master ser-
geants and 31 percent of sergeant majors (85,000)
were black. The armed forces' affirmative action
technique involves promotion boards that have the
authority to set goals— "The goals for this board are
to achieve a percentage of minority and female selec-
tion not less than the selection rate for all officers
being considered." Professor Moskos claims that the
advantage of this formula is "that if the goal is not
met, the board must defend its decision [and sol the
pressure to meet the goals is strong."5
Affirmative action clearly involves an element of
mobility pump priming, but federal assistance poli-
cies had already used this strategy much earlier,
especially for farmers, small businesses, and veter-
ans. Preferential treatment — called reverse dis-
crimination by Nathan Glazer— is basic to any fed-
eral affirmative assistance policy, for instance, when
some citizens get tax cuts and abatements and others
do not, or when some farmers (tobacco and dairy,
for example) benefit from subsidies while others
must live and die by market forces. The rationale un-
derlying preferential treatment in any federal assis-
tance policy is that it serves a higher public value.
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Thus, the charge of reverse discrimination leveled at
affirmative action is politically tendentious and
even approximates race baiting, seeking to delegiti-
mate in the public's eyes the preferential treatment
accorded blacks.
It is a fascinating phenomenon that black con-
servatives like Carter have emerged as proponents of
the delegitimation of preferential treatment under
affirmative action and thus as articulators of an
idealistic pure-merit paradigm, favoring the tighten-
ing-up of professional job market penetration for
recently locked out groups of blacks, Hispanics, and
women. Numerous and amusing contradictions sur-
round the activities of these conservatives. For ex-
ample, although Loury's above-mentioned observa-
tion has him seeking to protect two talented black
professors at Harvard Law School from what he
considers denigrating evaluation under the best
black syndrome, the professors themselves (Christo-
pher Edley and Randall Kennedy) are strong propo-
nents of affirmative action. They are emotionally
secure in their own intellectual and professional
achievements, and they assume an essentially tough,
pragmatic posture toward the presumptively af-
firmative-action-induced deflation of their achieve-
ments by whites (the best black syndrome). They do
this, I suggest, by way of a kind of cost-benefit
tradeoff with affirmative action policy. That is,
whatever emotional cost they endure due to the best
black syndrome, they discount in favor of the job
market benefits provided by their professorships at
an elite institution. Countless other Afro-Americans
faced with the best black syndrome do the same (as
do women faced with the best women syndrome). In
doing so, Afro-American or women professionals
are being more systematically realistic than the
idealistic pure-merit proponents among black con-
servatives.
Interface of Black and White Conservatism
If one single factor can be identified as the pri-
mary motivation of the opposition by black conser-
vatives to affirmative action, it is the best black syn-
drome. This is especially true of the highest
achievers among them, including Loury, Sowell,
Alan Keyes, and Carter (really best classified as hy-
brid conservative, part liberal and conservative).
These are individuals with top-level intellects and
thus with certain narcissistic inclinations — not in
the sense of vanity, but in terms of overweening self-
worth.
So in the eyes of the high achievers among black
conservatives, a mobility pump-priming policy like
affirmative action — clearly beneficial to many
Afro-Americans — is nonetheless expendable, par-
ticularly if the attitudinal milieux surrounding that
policy induces whites to deflate the full quantum of
achievement recognition due them. Yet it must be
asked why certain black high achievers turn to con-
servatism in order to secure a right to fair achieve-
ment recognition associated with establishmentar-
ian status patterns? Why don't they choose liberal
and progressive options that seek to egalitarianize
these patterns?
If one singlefactor can be identified as the
primary motivation of the opposition by black
conservatives to affirmative action, it is the best
black syndrome.
As Thorstein Veblen suggested early in this cen-
tury in Theory of the Leisure Class, newcomers to
elite roles — that is, the parvenus — in American soci-
ety seem compelled to utilize conservatism to fill a
vacuum in their self-worth that antedates their class
mobility. Put another way, conservatism offers the
parvenus a sense of substantive status identity, con-
trasted to the mercurial or tenuous status identity
connected with the ethnic or religious groups of
Irish, Italians, and Jews. Even so, given the tena-
cious exclusiveness of longstanding WASP elites, the
migration to conservatism by the parvenus nets
them only an imperfect status identity. Conse-
quently, conservatives among the parvenus still suf-
fer some status deficiency. This compounded status
anxiety is often overcome by radicalizing their new
conservatism — a process rather like the catechistic
activism of the religious convert. 6 So the newcomers
to conservatism often adopt an Americanistic
demeanor, which includes ultrapatriotism, defer-
ence to establishmentarian policies and norms, and
even nativistic patterns of assailing leftists, femin-
ists, and civil rights activists.
Neoconservatism among black intellectuals and a
growing number of the black intelligentsia is, then,
not unlike this historical and generic American pat-
tern. Its deviation from the generic pattern can be
attributed to the unique dynamics that defined the
racial-caste marginalization of Afro-Americans — a
marginalization far more culturally vicious and
more institutionally tenacious than that experienced
by Irish, Jews, and Italians through ethnic-caste
marginalization. This means, in turn, that once
racial-caste segregation is formally vanquished in-
stitutionally, the psychocultural and ritualistic
legacy of racist marginalization nonetheless exhibits
strong vestigial capacity.
It is, then, precisely this vestigial racist dynamic in
post-civil rights American society that conservative
black intellectuals are battling when opposing the
best black syndrome. They are correct, too, in this
opposition. Yet I suggest that they err significantly
12
in not recognizing that the issue of the best black
syndrome would exist whether or not affirmative
action policies prevailed. Why? Because most
whites — despite the new post-civil rights milieux—
still sustain a fervent, psychocultural investment in
neoracist interactions with Afro-Americans — a situ-
ation not unlike the psychocultural investment of
males in neosexist interactions despite the postfemi-
nist milieux of today's society. Furthermore, this
neoracist, psychocultural crutch is politically sus-
tained or manipulated by cynical, conservative, poli-
tical elites (Reaganite and Bushite Republicans) and
has been rekindled periodically during the crisises
that have populated the American social landscape
during the past twenty years. 7
Concluding Note: The Emperor's Clothes
It is the major limitation of Reflections of an Af-
firmative Action Baby that Carter, a talented legal
scholar, displays virtually no awareness of the sys-
temic sources of those features of affirmative action
policy he so abhors, especially the best black syn-
drome. He, therefore, lacks an understanding of
American conservatism, as do the other black con-
servative intellectuals I have already mentioned.
Carter virtually assumes that American conserva-
tism is little more than an innocent refuge for ostra-
cized black intellectuals (ostracized, that is, by emo-
tionalistic solidarity processes among Afro-Ameri-
cans). Carter calls these intellectuals "black dissen-
ters" thereby seeking to egalitarianize their image.
Carter's discussion of these so-called black dissen-
ters — covering more than four chapters and in many
ways comprising the heart of the book— will strike
most serious analysts of dissenting dynamics in
American history as rather bizarre.
I say bizarre for good reason. Carter packages this
discussion by way of a rather curious (perhaps
laughable) comparison of today's black dissenters
with such historical giants among black dissenting
intellectuals as W. E. B. Du Bois, Paul Robeson,
Martin Luther King, Jr., and Benjamin Davis. But,
this is just too clever by half, so to speak. Note how
Carter formulates this spurious comparison —
"Looking at the deep rift between the [neoconserva-
tive black] dissenters and the [black leadership]
mainstream, I cannot help but think back on the
Niagara Movement, a forerunner pf the NAACP,
organized in 1905 by Du Bois and other opponents
of Booker T. Washington in order to provide a plat-
form for their dissenting ideas and a base for their
burgeoning efforts to thwart Washington's ascend-
ancy." (pp. 139-140)
The simplistic logic here is that since A and B wear
the same suit— dissenters' garb, let's say—A and B
are politically the same, with the same message and
purpose. Well, it just isn't so. Basically, what Carter
is talking about is two different genre of Afro-
American dissenters— activist dissenters and ritual-
istic dissenters. While the former seek to activate
popular forces -the weak, left-outs, and margi-
nals—against greed, privilege, and oppression, the
latter seek, above all, obfuscation, manipulating the
dissident tradition and modalities of rhetoric, de-
meanor, and allusions to support established pat-
terns of power. In short, Carter must know that Du
Bois and his contemporaries were dissenting against
the very grain of authoritarian, capitalist power (in
the form of antitrade unionism) and racism, not just
against the autocratic, black, establishment puppet
Washington. Therefore, Carter surely must know
that black conservative dissenters — as he refers to
Steele, Loury, and Sowell — are dissenting merely in
the ritualistic sense, not in the substantive, antisys-
temic sense of activistic dissenters.
Carters discussion of these so-called black
dissenters . . . will strike most serious analysts of
dissenting dynamics in American history as
rather bizarre.
After all, the mainstream civil rights leadership
(including Benjamin Hooks, Jesse Jackson, and
Coretta King, for example) or black congressional
leaders are not the all-powerful network that Carter
cleverly characterizes them as being. They are an in-
fluential interest group, that is all. They have not,
therefore, been capable of preventing neoconserva-
tive blacks, including Carter, from circulating their
ideas— whether among blacks or whites — from
gaining jobs comparable to their talents, or from
penetrating major, local and national power net-
works, private or governmental. Thus, the ritualistic
dissenting of Carter's black dissenters is little more
than a facade or mask, behind which a small group
of talented Afro-American intellectuals have
fashioned a national platform for themselves and
penetrated a range of establishmentarian capitalist
networks (including, of course, obtaining lucrative
rewards in the form of fellowships and honor-
ariums) to a degree unprecedented for Afro-Ameri-
can intellectuals.
Moreover, black conservative intellectuals do not
yet have an operational constituency among Afro-
Americans — as, for instance, neoconservative
Jewish intellectuals have had since the emergence in
the early 1970s of the pro-Israel lobby, Jewish busi-
nesses and bureaucrats. Interestingly enough, the
trail to establishmentarian power that black conser-
vatives have followed was first blazed by neocon-
servative Jewish intellectuals who, like black
conservatives, evolved out of an historically margin-
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alized ethnic background. Jewish neoconservatives
have also been the primary patrons of Carter's black
dissenters putting such influential organs at their
disposal as Commentary, the Public Interest, the
New Republic, the National Interest, and the Ameri-
can Scholar, to name just a few.
Considering the patronage of such powerful, neo-
conservative, Jewish intellectuals — linked as they
have been for nearly twenty years to the establish-
mentarian, right-wing, WASP, corporate, and insti-
tutional networks— it is a clear distortion of the
term dissenter to apply it as Carter does to black
conservative intellectuals. Intrinsically, dissenting
groups and individuals assail overweening, estab-
lishmentarian power and authority (as in Luther vs.
the Vatican, Soviet dissidents vs. Stalinism, and Du
Bois vs. American racism). Above all, such dissen-
ters risk life, limbs, family safety, professional op-
portunities, and comfort— a pattern of risks and in-
security that black conservative intellectuals would
never be forced to experience under the patronage of
powerful white conservatives. In short, Carter's
black dissenters are client dissenters, akin to client or
satellite states.
Overall, Carter's argument about black dissenters
(one of two central arguments in his book) is riddled
with distortion — clever distortion sometimes, but
distortion nonetheless. It will not, I think, survive
rigorous evaluation. Carter, I believe, senses this
problem of exaggerated characterization and
formulation, and so he resorts to a back-up strategy
of what might be called deceptive nuance. For in-
stance, one chapter criticizes American conserva-
tives for their nearly zero track record in behalf of
Afro-American freedom and equality. But this criti-
cism is more an afterthought than an intrinsic dis-
cussion. It is, in short, window dressing. In reality,
Reflections of an Affirmative Action Baby is an
apology for American conservatism, in general, and
for black conservatism, in particular. But it is not
good apology— the dialectical kind, that is, in which
the author, though tendentious, discovers self-
limitations and moral discrepancies.
In Reflections of an Affirmative Action Baby,
Stephen Carter gives us two rather self-serving ob-
servations: first, that black conservative intellec-
tuals are heroic and flawless — at least compared to
the emotionalistic, solidarity-minded elements of
the Afro-American mainstream; and second, that he
too approaches a certain perfection as a black intel-
lectual. Alas, he doesn't even have an ideological or
political pigeonhole— " . . . it is best for intellectuals
to be politically unpredictable," as he says. Carter
practices an open-door policy, or so he tells us, and
it is presumably merely accidental that those who
enter his favor in Reflections of an Affirmative
Action Baby are establishmentarians, conservatives,
and the best and brightest. To believe this is to be-
lieve in tooth fairies.
Martin Kilson teaches political science at Harvard University
and is the author of Political Change in a West African State
(1966) and Neither Insiders Nor Outsiders: Blacks in White
America (forthcoming).
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